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purchase money in full, different
results would have followed accord-
ing as the jurisdiction in which the
case arose was English or American.
In England, the insurance com-
pany could have recovered from
Spencer (agreeably with the rule
laid down in Castellain v. Preston)
so much of the purchase money as
was equivalent to the policy money.
If this were not so, the vendor,
instead of beingmerely indemnified
would make a profit. The vendee
would not be entitled to the pro-
ceeds of the policy, for the insur-
ance was not effected for his benefit,
and being a personal contract, does
not run with the land. Nor, as has
been seen, will the English Courts
carry the doctrine of trusteeship
far enough to protect him. In the
United States, however, (if the doc-
trine of the principal case is cor-
rect), it would seem that the lessor,
under such an arrangement as that
before the Court, is atrustee for the
lessee with the option to purchase,
just as in the case of vendor axid
vendee under articles. It follows,
therefore, that even if Spencer had
effected the insurance in the prin-
cipal case in his own name, the
vendee would have been entitled to
call him to an account i equity for
the policy money. Accordingly, it
should seem to be clear that the
vendee, upon completiig the pur-
chase has an even stronger claim
to the policy money, where, as.
here, the insurance was. effected.
"as interest may appear."
GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER.
. [NOTE :-In the Mlarch number of the American Law Register and Review there-
will appear a comment upon the case of Castellain v. Preston (suzra), by GEOROE
RICHA ms, Esq.]
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BURY v. YOUNG ET AL.' SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
Deed-Validity-Delivery to third person with instrudions not to deliver
to grantees till death of grantor.
When the grantor executes a deed of real estate, and delivers it to a
third party, with instructions merely to hold it, without recording, until
his death, and then to'deliver it to the grantees, the grantor cannot recall
the deed, nor alter its provisions, and has no interest in the land, except
a life estate; the delivery to the deposJitary makes him a trustee of the
deed for the grantees; and his subsequent delivery to them, in pursu-
ance of-his instructions, is a valid delivery, though made after the death
of the grantor, for the estate vests at the time of the delivery to him-
' Reported in 33 Pac. Rep. 338.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The plaintiff, in the above case, Mrs. Bury, and the
defendant, Mrs. Young, were sisters, daughters of one M. A.
J-Iinkson. Their father, while suffering from a paralytic
stroke, called to his bedside one Hazen, an attorney-at-law, for
legal advice as to the disposition of his property; and acting\
upon his advice, signed and acknowledged a grant deed of
his real estate, in which his aforesaid daughters were named
as grantees. This deed he gave to Hazen with instructions
not to record it, but to deliver it to the grantees upon his
death. He appears to have recovered from his sickness, and
afterwards endeavored to secure possession of the deed from
Hazen, but without success. He then subsequently made a
will devising all his real estate to Mrs. Young. After his
death Hazen delivered the deed in question to Mrs. Bury,
who brought this action of partition, and relied on the deed
to support her claim. This the Court upheld, on the ground
that the title passed with the delivery to Hazen.
VALIDITY OF A DEED NOT TO TAKE EFFECT UNTiL THE DEATH OF
THE GRANTOR.
The limitation of the operation
of a deed till after the death of the
grantor may be effected in two
ways: ist, by clearly expressing
that intention in the instrument
itself, as by the reservation of a life
estate in the grantor, or by other
apt forms of expression; and, 2d,
by some act dehors the instrument,
as by retaining it in the hands of
the grantor, or by depositing it in
the hands of a third party, with
instructions not to deliver it till
after the grantor's death.
I. It is scarcely necessary to cite
cases to the effect that a deed re-
serving a life-estate to the grantor
is valid, other things being equal;
but its validity is not so clear when
the intention so to reserve is not
expressed in proper technical
terms. A deed that, by its own
language, is limited to take effect
after the death of the grantor, of
necessity borders closely on the
line of testamentary dispositions;
and when once it crosses that line,
however good it may be as a will,
it can no longer be held valid as a
deed: Vreeland v. Vreeland (N. J.),
21 Atl. Rep. 627. Whether the in-
strument is one thing or the other
is a pure question of construction
to be gathered only from its own,
terms. The form matters nothing.
The true test is whether the estate
granted is intended to pass to the
grantee upon delivery, or not until
after the death of the grantor.
(a.) In the first case, the instru-
ment is a deed, reserving a life
estate to the grantor by implication:
Carns v. Jones, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.)
248; Elmore v. Mustin, 28 Ala.
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3o9; Golding v. Golding, 24 Ala.
122; Macumber v. Bradley, 2S
Conn. 445; McGlawii v. McGlawn,
17 Ga. 234 ; Johnson v. Hines, 31
Ga. 720; .Daniel v. Veali 32 Ga.
589 ; Clayton v. Livermore, 7 Ired.
(N. C. L.) 92; Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss.
91 ; Folk v. Varny, 9 Rich. Eq. 3o3 ;
Williams v. Sullivan, io Rich. Eq.
217. Though made in expectation
of death: Brown v. Atwater, 25
Minn. 520. When the instrument
contained the words, "give, grant
andconvey," in one clause, followed
by "to have and to hold after my
death," in the next, it was held a
deed, not a will, on the ground that
it was a grant of a present estate,
the enjoyment of which was not to
begin until the event specified
should occur: johnson v. Hines,
supna. And so when the land was
conveyed, " after my decease, and
not before," these words were held
to show merely that the use and
enjoyment of the estate granted
-was postponed until that time:
Owen v. Williams, II4 Ina. 179;
S. C., I5 N. E. Rep. 678.
(b.) Inthe second case, where the
estate does not pass in pir&,senti,
by the terms of the instiament, but
only at the death of the grantor, it
can operate only as a will, for a post
mortem disposition of property can-
not be made by deed; and must, of
course, be executed with all the
formalities of a will in order to be
held valid: Habergham v. Vincent,
2 Ves. Jr., on p. 231; Wellborn v.
Weaver, 17 Ga. 267; Carey v. Den-
nis, 13 Md. 1 ; Bigley v. Souvey, 45
Mich. 3 7o; S. C., 8 N. W. Rep. 98;
Sartor v. Sartor, 39 Miss. 76o;
Rose v. Quick, 30 Pa. 225 ; Fred-
erick's App., 52 Pa. 338; Prew v.
Clarke,' 8o Pa. 170; Carlton v.
Cameron, 54 Tex. 72; Jones v.
Loveless, 99 Ind. 317. When a
grantor reserves to himself the use
of all the property granted during
his natural life, "then to go to the
above named persons, and from
thenceforth to be their-property
absolutely," the instrument is a
'testamentary. paper, not a deed;
Symmes v. Arnold, io Ga. 506;
See Cravy v. Rawlins, 8 Ga. 45o.
And'the words, "give and devise
- .. the property I may die pos-
sessed of," make an instrnment.a
will, though in the form. of a deed.
Brewer v. Baxter, 41 Ga. 212.
This -distinction is one of great
practical importance ; fbr if.the in-
strument is a deed, it is of course
irrevocable when once delivered,
and rights acquired under it can-
not be affected, other things being
equal, by subsequent conveyances,
wills, or the rights of creditors;
while, if it is a will, it is, of course,
subject to all these. And it would
seem that in some cases this very
matter of the intervention of sub-
sequently acquired rights has been
an important factor in settling the
question of the proper classification
of the instrument: See Jones v.
Loveless, 99 Ind. 317; Owen v.
Williams, II4 Ind. 179; S. C., 15
N. R. Rep. 678.
II. When a deed, absolute in its
terms, and containing no resdrva-
tion of any estate- in the grantor,
is signed, sealed and acknowl-
edged, but liever delivered, and is
retained in the possession of the
grantor until his death, subsequent
possession of it by the grantee can
confer no title upon.him, because
it is void for want of delivery :
-Cline v. Jones, iii Ill. 563; An-
derson v. Anderson (Ind.), 24 N.
E. Rep. io36; Miller v. Murfield,
(Iowa) 44 N. W. Rep. 540; Mart-
ling v. Martling (N. J.), 20 AU.
Rep. 4r. And the fact of such re-
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tention is strong Prima facie evi-
dence that the instrument was in-
tended to operate as a will, not as
a deed : Schuffert v. Grote,' 88
Mich. 65o; Stilwell v. Hubbard,
20 Wend. (N. Y.), 44. It would
hardly be likely, however, that
such a deed would be upheld as a
will merely on the strength of
this presumption. It is difficult
to see what principle could be in-
voked to support such a ruling.
But, though the presumption is
that a deed retained by the grantor
in his possession has not been de-
livered, there may be facts con-
nected with and qualifying that re-
tention, which amount to a valid
delivery, as when the deed has
been recorded: Glaze. v. Ins. Co.,
87 Mich. 349; S. C., 49 N. W.
Rep. 595 ; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind.
lo9.
III. So far, the question of the
validity of the deeds under consid-
eration has been almost purely a
question of construction, dependent
upon the language of the instru-
ment and its legal effect, the only
question of fact being as to the de-
livery. But in the class of deeds
we are now about to discuss the
intention of the grantor, in the
previous cases to be gathered from
the instrument itself, and so a
question of law, becomes also a
question of fact to be decided from
the circumstances attendant upon
the execution and delivery of the
deed. These deeds are those
which, though absolute in form,
are delivered to a third person,
with the understanding that they
are not to be delivered to the
grantee until the death of the
grantor, thus virtually securing a
ife estate to the latter.
The first question is, of course,
whether such a delivery is sufficient
to pass the title to the grantee. It
is beyond controversy that delivery
need not be made to the grantee in
a deed personally; it maybe made
to another for his use, anditmakes
no difference when he receives the
deed: Sneathen v. Sneathen, 104
Mo. 201; or, for that matter,
whether he receives it at all. The
title passes with the delivery to
the depositary, unless the grantor
retains some power of control or
revocation, in which case there is
no delivery: Duer v. James, 42
Md. 492; Bovee v. Hinde, 135 IMI.
137. The delivery, then, is suffi-
cient, unless the instrument is to
be considered as testamentary.
But we have already seen that a
mere postponement of the enjoy-
ment of an estate granted will not
make the instrument conveying it
a testamentary paper: See cases
cited ante, I (a). The whole
question, then, resolves itself into
this: Did the grantor intend to
convey a present estate to the
grantee, merely postponing his en-
joyment of it until his death, or
did he intend the estate to vest
only upon that event?
There are two classes of deeds,
to which these bear a close resem-
blance :-escrows, and deeds to be
delivered on the happening of
some future event. But there is a
clear distinction between the t Vo.
An escrow, the second delivery of
which is dependent upon the per-
formance of a condition, of neces-
sity can vest no estate until the
performance of that condition;
and the title, therefore, passes only
upon the second delivery, that
from the depositary to the grantee,
except in rare cases, where the
rights of third parties have inter-
vened, or the grantor has done
some act which would defeat the
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estate granted, if the strict rule
were adhered to; and in which the
title is accordingly held to vest by
relation to the first delivery: Price
v. Pitts., Ft. Wayne & Chic. R. R.
Co., 34 Ill. i3; Shirley v. Ayres,
14 Ohio, 307. But when the final
delivery of a deed only awaits the
lapse of time, or some contingency,
as, for example, when the grantee
shall come to town, the title is
held to vest in the grantee upon
the delivery to the depositary, and
the latter is only a trustee of the
deed for the benefit of the grantee:
13 Vin. Abr. tit, Faits or Deeds, p.
23, pl. 9; Bryan v. Wash, 7 Ill.
557; Cook v. Hendricks, 4 T. B.
Monroe (Ky.), 5oo; contra, Demes-
mey v. Gravelin, 56 Ill. 93.
The class of deeds under consid-
eration can hardly be properly
classed with escrows, though this
has sometimes been done; for
there is, in these, no condition to
be performed by the grantee. And
further, if they are so classed, it
would be difficult to find any prin-
ciple upon which they could be held
valid; for the title to the estate
conveyed by an escrow dates only,
as has been said, from the second
delivery, except when there are
circumstances that would render
the strict application of the rule
inequitable. Applying this rule,
where no rights of third parties
had intervened, the title conveyed
by deeds of this class would vest
only after the death of the grantor,
and that would make them opera-
tive only as testamentary disposi-
tions. Even when the rights of
third parties had intervened, there
would be no true equity in follow-
ing the rule as to escrows, for as
these deeds are almost always
purely voluntary, the grantee can
have no superior equity against in-
tervening rights. .But, on the
other hand, these deeds present an
almost perfect analogy with deeds
to be delivered on the happening
of some future event, both in their
nature and their operation; and
should be preferably classed with
them.
Accordingly, it is the general
doctrine that when a deed, absolute
on its face, is delivered to a third
party, to be by him delivered to
the grantee after the deith of the
grantor, the delivery is absolute, if
the grantor retains no control or
'dominion over the dead in the
hands of the depositary; the effect
of the conveyance is to vest the
estate in the grantee, subject to a
life estate in the grantor; the de-
positary becomes a trustee of the
deed for the grantee; and the de-
livery of the deed by him, in pur-
suance of the grantor's instruction,
is, to all intents and purposes,' as
valid as if made by th~e grantor
during his life: Doe v. Bennett,
8 C. & P. 124; McCalla v.
Bane, 45 Fed. Rep. 828; Stew-
art v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317;
Hockett v. Jones, 70 Ind. 227;'
Squires v. Summers, 85 Ind. 252;
Smiley v. Smiley, 1r4 Ind. 258;
Goodpaster v. Leathers, 123 Ind.
121; Hinson z. Bailey (Iowa), 35
N. W. Rep. 626; Wheelwright v.
Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 447; Foster
v. Mansfield,'3 Metc. (Mass.) 412;
O'Kelly v. O'Kelly, 8 Mete. (Mass.)
436, 439 ; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Mass.
30, Latham v. Udell, 38 Mich.
238; Williams v. Latham (Mo.),
20 S. W. Rep., 99; Parker v.
Dustin, 2 Fost. (N. H.) 424; Hath-
away v. Payne, 34 N. Y. 92; Die-
fendorf v. Diefendorf, 8 N. Y.
Suppl. 617; Crain v. Wright, 114
N. Y. 307; Crooks v. Crooks, 34
Ohio St. 61o; Ball v. Foreman,
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37 Ohio St. 132 Geisinger's Est.,
ii Pa. C. C. R. 168; Stephens v.
Huss, 54 Pa. 20; Stephens v.
Rinehart, 72 Pa. 434; Albright v.
Albright (Wis.), 36 N. W. Rep.
254; Bury v. Young (Cal.), the
principal case, 33 Pac. Rep. 338.
But see Stone r. Duvall, 77 Ill.
475. Even if the depositary de-
liver the deed to the grantee be-
fore the death of the grantor, in
breach of his trust, the delivery
will be good to vest the estate at
the death of the grantor: Wallace
v. Harris, 32 Mich. 380. But he
will not be allowed to oust or dis-
turb the latter during his lifetime:
Alsop, v. Bckles, 81 Ill. 424. The
rights of third persons, in the ab-
sence of fraud, will not be allowed
to intervene: Smiley v. Smiley,
114 Ind. 258; contra, Davis v.
Cross, I4 Lea (Tenn.), 637. And a
conveyance of the estate, made by
the grantee, beforie the death of
the grantor, is sufficient to pass his
title thereto: Tooley v. Dibble, 2
Hill (N. Y.), 641. When part of
the land conveyed was taken by a
railroad company subsequent to
the delivery of the deed to the de-
positary, the damages therefor
were held to go to the grantecp of
the estate, not to the executor of
the grantor: Geisinger's Est., ii
Pa. C. C. R. 168.
If, however, the grantor manifest
an intention that no present estate
shall vest in the grantee, the de-
livery to the depositary is not a
delivery to him, and his title can
date only from.the second delivery.
In such a case, the depositary is
the agent of the grantor, not of the
grantee, and, his authority being
revoked by the death of his princi-
pal, his delivery of the deed after
the death of the latter, can vest no
title in the grantee. Accordingly,
10
any retention ofcontrolor dominion
over the deed in the hands of the
depositary, which is acknowledged
on all sides to show an intention
that the estate shall not finally pass
from the grantor at the time of the
delivery to the depositary, will
make the instrument a mere testa-
mentary disposition, and therefore
invalid as a deed: Wellborn v.
Weaver, 17 Ga. 267; Stinson v.
Anderson, 96 Ill. 373; Hale v.
Joslin, 134 Mass. 31o; Weisinger
v. Cock, 67 Miss. 511; Baker v.
Haskell, 47 N. H. 479; Prutaman
v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644. The reser-
vation of a right on the part of the
grantor to withdraw the deed at any
time before his death: Brown v.
Brown, 66 Me. 316. .The delivery
to the depositary with instructions
to deliver it to the grantee, "pro-
vided it is not previously recalled:"1
Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 46o. And
directions as follows: "Take this
deed and keep it. If I get well I
will call for it. If I don't, give
it to Billy (the grantee):" Wil-
liams v. Schatz, 42 Ohio St. 47, have
been held to show such a retention
of control as will render the deed
nugatory.
As the grantor, in such a case,
has the right to rescind or recall
the deed at pleasure, the mere fact
that the grantee gets possession of
it and records it will .not confer
any title on him: Pennington v.
Pennington, 75 Mich. 6oo.
- A few old cases are in opposition
to this rule, holding that when the
deed is delivered to the depositary,
subject to the grantor's control,
the delivery by the former to the
grantee after the death of the
grantor will pass the title, if that
right of control is never, in fact,
exercised. But these rest upon
very insufficient grounds, and can-
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not prevail against the weight of
authority cited above: See Belden
v. Carter, 4 Day (Conn.), 66; Shed
v. Shed, 3 N. H. 432 (expressly
overruled in Cook v. Brown, 34
N. ]I. 46o); Morse v. Slason, 13
Vt. 296.
Though such an instrument is
not valid as a deed, it may, never-
theless, if executed with the proper
formalities, as we have seen, be
good as a will; but in that case
will of course be "subject to all
rights of third persons that have
intervened between the date of its
delivery to the depositary and the
death of the grantor: Jones v.
Loveless, 99 Ind. 317.
It only remains to consider the
manner in which such a deed, when
valid, takes effect. A number, per-
haps the majority of the cases, hold
that it vests the title by relation to
the first delivery. But there are a
very respectable list of well-con-
sidered cases that hold that the title
vests in. the grantee immediately
on the delivery to the depositary.
This seems to be in every regard
the better view. The cases that
hold the title to vest by relation
have undoubtedly been misled by
the impression that these deeds
were similar to an escrow, an im-
pression that we have seen to be
without foundation. The doctrine
of relation is even in the case of an
escrow only permitted to defeat in-
tervening rights; and that would
be a poor excuse in the case of a
voluntary deed. Further, the first
delivery in case of an escrow is
conditional, and cannot vest title
except by relation; while-in the
cases under consideration, the first
delivery must be absolute in order
to vest any 'title, by the second
delivery, and if so, what is to pre-
vent its vesting the title of itself,
without regard to the second? On
every ground, then, the latter doc-
trine is more consonant with reason,
principle and justice.
To sum up the results of the
preceding discussion: i. Any deed,
which purports to convey a pre-
sent estate, even thoughlthat estate
is not to be enjoyed -until the
death of the grantor, is valid as a
deed, unless never delivered, either
to the grantee or some person for
him. 2. A deed, delivered to a
third person with instructions not
to deliver it to the grantee till after
the death of the grantor, is valid
as a deed, if that delivery be abso-
lute; and vests a present estate in
the grantee, the depositary being
a trustee of the deed for him; but
is of no effect as such, if the deliv-
ery is made subject to the subse-
quent control or dominion of the
grantor. 3. Any instrument,
evincing an intention to make a
post-mortem disposition of prop-
erty, though nugatory as a deed,
will be valid as a testamentary
paper, if executed with the reqtli-
site ?ormalities of a will. 4. But a
deed, purporting to convey a Pre-
sent interest, which is never de-
livered, but simply retained in the
possession of the grantor till his
death, whatever may be presumed
to have been his intention in so
retaining it, will be of no effect,
either as a deed or as a will, unless
there is some direct proof that it
was intended to operate as the*
latter. R. D. S.
